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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN HALES and VALDA 
HALES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
VANCE PETERSON and Case No. 9294 
MARGERY PETERSON, 
d.b.a. Valley Builders Supply 
Company, and PAUL 
CALDWELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiffs to 
recover for the alleged wrongful death of their 
minor child, Nila Hales, who was struck by a truck 
operated by the defendants on October 24, 1958 in 
Redmond, Utah (R. 1-3). The case was tried before 
the Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., sitting with a 
jury, at Richfield, Sevier County, State of Utah 
commencing on the 7th day of March 1960 ( R. 142) . 
At the conclusion of the evidence the case was sub-
mitted to the jury (R. 366), who returned a ver-
dict of "no cause of action" in favor of the defen-
dants and against the plaintiffs. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion For New Trial upon 
various grounds which included that the trial court 
erred in the i11structions given to the jury and erred 
in that it failed to give other instructions; that the 
trial court refused to adm.it evidence of certain 
tests which the plaintiffs had made; that defense 
counsel was guilty of misconduct; and that the 
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
\The questions to be decided in a general way_ then 
are: Whether or not the evidence was so favorable 
to the plaintiffs as to compel a finding by the jury 
that they were entitled to recover; whether or not 
the trial court should have permitted the evidence 
of tests made by the plaintiffs to be admitted; 
whether the trial court erred in the instructions 
which it gave or refused to give to the jury; an~ 
I 
whether or not plaintiffs received a fair and im-
partial hearing. 
The facts of the case are as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident occurred in front of an elementary 
school in Redmond, Utah ( R. 7-8) . The general area 
is illustrated by a diagram (Exhibit 9) and a series 
of pictures (Exhibits 8, 11 and A). The elementary 
school building is located on the north side of a 
street which extends in an east-west direction. The 
front of the school building is located a distance of 
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58.5 feet from the north side of the aforementioned 
street. There are a slide, teeters and swings lo-
cated in a playground area southeast of the school 
building. The slide, which is the piece of playground 
equipment closest to the north side of the street, is 
17 feet north of the curb line of the street. The 
school building is approximately 108 feet from a 
street which borders the school grounds on the west 
extending north-south. The area between the school 
building and this street is clear or open. The school 
grounds are not enclosed with a fence or anything 
of that nature (R. 249). 
There was a gravel walk on the north side of 
the street extending east-west and a cement walk 
on the south side of this street ( R. 229). 
According to the diagram (Exhibit 9) the street 
in front of the school was 48;3 feet wide from curb 
to curb. According to one of the investigating offi-
cers, State Highway Patrolman Bud G. Larson, the 
street is 49 feet 6 inches from curb to curb ( R. 229). 
The street is h'ard surfaced although the record does 
not disclose whether this is asphalt, oil or pavement 
(see Exhibits 8, 11 and A). 
The sidewalk on the south side of the street 
is 8.5 feet wide. 
Starting at the intersection of this street with 
the north-south street west of the school, there are 
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no buildings on the south side of the street until we 
reach a point 108 feet east of the intersection. At 
this point there is a small building 26 feet wide 
which is the Post Office. There is then a vacant lot 
49 feet wide. Adjacent to this is an abandoned build-
ing referred to as the "opera house" in the record. 
Between this building and the next building in which 
are located some stores there is an alley 11.5 feet 
wide which is shown in plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11. 
In the building designated as "stores" there were 
two establishments, a sewing shop operated by Mrs. 
Carl Anderson on the west side and a grocery store 
operated by Mrs. Mathel Mickelson and her husband 
on the east side ( R. 328-329). Continuing east there 
was another alley 14 feet wide and then a building 
19 feet wide housing a billiard hall. 
There was a stop sign located on the south-
west corner of the intersection of the streets border-
ing the school on the south and on the west. There 
was no painted cross walk anywhere on the street 
extending east-west; nor was there any painted 
line down the center of the road (R. 234). The road 
in front of the school is slightly down-grade to the 
east (R. 284). 
At the time of this accident there were five 
cars parked parallel with the south curb of the 
street in front of the school (R. 294, 314). Three 
of these cars have been identified as Mrs. Fair-
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bourne's truck, the principal's car and the Hales 
car ( R. 17 4). The Fairbourne car is marked "F" 
on the diagram; the principal's car is marked "P" 
on the diagram and the Hales car is marked "H" 
on the diagram. 
The principal of the elementary school was 
Roger E. Nielsen (R. 236). He owned the car desig-
nated as the principal's car, which was parked 
slightly to the west of the alley on the east side of 
the abandoned building designated as the "opera 
house" ( R. 238). The position of his vehicle rela-
tive to the alley is illustrated by plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 11. Mrs. Hales' car was parked directly to the 
west or behind the principal's car (R. 239). The 
principal's car was a 1946 Chevrolet pick-up with a 
rack for cattle on the back of the truck. Part of 
the rack is visible in Exhibit No. 11. The Hales 
vehicle was approximately two feet behind the prin-
cipal's vehicle and they were both about six to eight 
inches from the curb ( R. 29'6). 
The defendant Paul Caldwell, the driver of the 
defendant's vehicle ( R. 279), testified that on the 
morning of the accident he had been up to a gravel 
plant in Redmond, Utah (R. 280-281). He was 
driving the truck which is pictured in plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 8 and 10, which truck had dual wheels 
on the rear ( R. 281) . It has a metal bed with wood 
sides approximately 4 feet high. The bed extends 
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about 1 foot on each side .of the cab of the truck 
(R. 282). 
Mr. Caldwell drove his truck from the gravel 
plant to the intersection formed by the streets bord-
ering the school on the west and the south sides. 
He stopped his truck for the stop sign at this in-
tersection (R. 283). He then continued on east on 
the street on the south side of the school grounds. 
As he was driving down this street he noted five 
automobiles parked parallel on the south side of 
the street ( R. 29'5) and children over by the school 
grounds playing ball. He had accelerated to a speed 
between 15 and 20 miles per hour (R. 285) when 
·he felt a "bump" on the right rear duals, indicating 
that they had passed over some object (R. 286). 
He brought his vehicle to a stop within a distance 
of 35 feet and upon getting out of the truck saw 
the minor child lying in the road approximately 35 
feet west of the truck (R. 341). 
Mr. Caldwell has drawn a blue line on Exhibit 
No. 9 indicating the road traveled by his vehicle 
before and after the accident. The spot where the 
child was lying is indicated by the 'dark area identi-
fied as a blood spot on Exhibit 11 ( R. 289). 
V aida Hales, the mother of the minor child, 
Nila Hales, was employed as a teacher at the ele-
mentary school which Nila was attending, Nila being 
in the fourth grade ( R. 173). They left home the 
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morning of the accident a little before 8:30 o'clock 
and arrived at the school grounds a few minutes 
later, where Mrs. Hales parked her automobile be-
hind Mr. Nielsen's truck. The child had some eggs 
and pop bottles which she was to take to the gro-
cery store. After they arrived across from the school 
Nila went to the store and her mother went across 
the street to the school building ( R. 17 5) . This was 
the last Mrs. Hales saw of her child until after the 
accident. 
Mrs. Mathel Mickelson, who was running the 
store across from the school ground's in the 'buil1ding 
design a ted "stores" in the diagram ( R. 228) , ob-
served the child come into the store a little before a 
quarter to nine o'clock with a pan of eggs (R. 329). 
The child then left the store and came back with 
some bottles, stating that her mother had sent them 
in and that her mother would be back at noon to get 
a few things ( R. 330). She had a quarter and bought 
five licorices and then left the store ( R. 330). The 
witness had taken the eggs and started over to the 
egg case and had taken seven or eight steps when 
she felt with her feet a "thud" on the floor (R. 330). 
She ran out into the street where she observed the 
child and then ran back into the store and told her 
husband to call for help. As she did so she saw Mr. 
Nielsen, Mrs. Fairbourne and Mrs. Hales come out 
of the school building ( R. 332). 
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There were two children who claimed to have 
seen the accident. The first of these is David Weldon, 
a child 8¥2 years of age (R. 261) whose testimony 
is set out in the plaintiffs' brief. That he was con-
fused is obvious from a reading of his testimony 
and the fact that his testimony is not consistent 
with the physical evidence found by the officers 
whose testimony will appear later. At the outset, 
when being questioned by plaintiffs' attorney, he 
testified that the last time he saw the deceased on 
the morning of the accident was when she was over 
by the swings and that he did not see her come to 
school the morning of the accident (R. 262-263). 
Upon being asked if he saw Nila when she was 
over by the cars ( R. 264) David then testified that 
she was over there by the alley the last time he saw 
her ( R. 265). Upon being asked where she went 
when she was over by the alley, he testified, "I 
think she put some groceries in this car" (R. 265). 
He then went on to state that the deceased, Nila, 
got in the back of her car and then walked out into 
the street to the middle of the road (R. 267) where 
she stopped and stood and yelled, "Help, help" 
( R. 268). The child concluded by stating that he 
was not positive as to what happened but that he 
was trying to tell how he thought the accident hap-
pened. 
The eye witness account which it will be seen 
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was consistent with the physical evidence in the 
case was that of Gerald Christensen, a boy 13 years 
of age (R. 312). He testified that he was on the 
school grounds playing kick-ball when he saw the 
deceased and her mother drive up (R. 313). He 
saw Nila go into the store and stay in. there for 
a few minutes and then come back out and put 
some things in the car (R. 313), which was on the 
side of the street across from the school house. 
She then came around between the front of the 
Hales car and the back of the principal's car and, 
in the words of the witness, "darted out" into the 
street ( R. 314) . The truck at that point evidently 
passed between the witness and the deceased as he 
just caught a glance of her between the cab and 
the rack of the defendants' truck. It was his im-
pression that she was struck by the rack of the 
truck ( R. '316) . On cross examination he stated 
that "it looked like the rack had hit her and the 
wheels had caught her someway and flipped her". 
The first investigating officer to arrive at the 
scene of the accident was Carl Anderson, who at 
the time of this accident was the city marshal of 
Redmond City (R. 338). He was told of the acci-
dent by his wife at approximately 20 or 15 minutes 
to 9:00 and went immediately to the scene where 
he found Mrs. Hales kneeling beside the body, Bessie 
Poulson, Mrs. Mickelson and the truck driver, Paul 
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C·aidwell. He first called an ambulance ~and then 
interviewed Mr. Caldwell, who told him that he. did 
. . ' . . . .. 
not see the child ( R. 341) . He observed three .. cars 
parked in the immediate vicinity, which have been 
previously identified as the principal's car, Mrs. 
Hales' car and the Fairbourne car. He measured the 
distance from the body to the defendants' truck. 
He found the truck to be 35 feet to the east of the 
body. He then authorized the defendant Paul Cald-
well to move his truck s.o that other traffic might 
pass up and down the street. When the other officers 
from the Sheriff's office and the highway patrol 
arrived, the witness, Carl Anderson, an~d they made 
an inspection of the truck for any indication as 
to what part of the truck had hit the child. The 
only marks that they could find on the truck was 
some blood between the duals on the right rear of 
the truck. He took no other measurements at the 
scene but did observe tread marks leading from 
the body of the deceased and a small blood spot at 
approximately the distance of one turn of the wheel 
from the body of the deceased. 
Another officer who investigated the accident 
was Murvin L. Colby, Chief Deputy Sheriff of 
Sevier County (R. 193), who arriveid at the scene 
shortly after 9 :00 o'clock A.M. At the time he ar-
rived Highway Patrolman Bud Larsen and Carl 
Anderson, City Marshal of Redmond,· and a number 
10 
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of the town people were around. The deceased had 
been taken from the scene of the accident. He took 
the pictures Exhibits 8, 10 and 11 and defendants' 
Exhibit A. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8 and 11 show the 
large blood spot which he found on the highway ( R. 
195-19'7) . Exhibit 11 also shows the alley between 
the opera building and the stores previously re-
ferred to and principal Nielsen's truck which was 
parked immediately to the west of the alley. Ex-
hibit 10 is a picture of the defendants' truck (R. 
196) and Defendants' Exhibit A shows the approx-
imate location of the blood spots with reference to 
the sides of the street. The officer in that picture 
is standing in the area marked by the blood. He 
was also present at the interview with the defen-
dant driver, Paul Caldwell, who stated that he was 
coming down the road and felt a "'bump". Know-
ing that no "bump" should be there, he knew he 
must have run over something. He stopped his truck 
and got out and saw the child lying on the street. 
He stated that at the time he thought he was going 
around 15, but not exceeding 20 miles per hour; 
that he had stopped at a stop sign just half a block 
prior to that ( R. 199) . He also participated in the 
inspection of the defendants' truck for any indica-
tion as to what part of the truck had struck the 
child and foun'd no marks on the entire truck with 
the exception of a blood stain on the outside of the 
inside dual of the right rear wheel (R. 205). 
11 
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Highway Patrolman Bud Larson was the of-
ficer who made the measu~ements at the scene of 
the accident. His testimony is illustrated by the 
green pencil marks on the diagram, plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit 9 (R. 217). There was a blood spot on the road 
approximately 2 feet in diameter (R. 223). It was 
18 feet 5 inches from the south side of the road to 
the _ center of the blood spot ( R. 223) and 31 feet 
from that spot to the north curb ( R. 230) . There 
was a small second blood spot approximately one 
roll of a truck tire from the first ( R. 223) . The 
street was 49 feet 6 inches wide from curb to curb 
( R. 229) He observed the pickup truck with the 
high rack on it on the south side of the street im-
mediately west of the alley (R. 226) and the second 
vehicle (the Hales' vehicle) immediately behind it 
(R. 227). He also participated in the inspection of 
the defendants'_ vehicle and found no marks on the 
vehicle except on the rear dual wheels (R. 2130) He 
testified that he did not see any scuff marks or 
debris on the highway indicating the course of the 
truck from the child's body to any point east of 
there (R. 224) and that there was no marked cross 
walk in the area ( R. 234). He said the posted speed 
limit in the area was 20 miles per hour ( R. 232). 
The school principal, Roger E. Nielsen, who 
had previously testified as a witness for the plain-
tiffs, took the stand near the end of the plaintiffs' 
12 
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case to testify to a test which he had conducted. 
He testified that he took seven girls and asked them 
first to walk 100 feet at the normal pace they would 
walk coming to school, then to go back and walk 
as fast as they could without running, and the third 
time to run that distance at as fast a speed as they 
coul'd run. He then proposed to testify as to the indi-
vidual times that each of these individual girls 
walked leisurely, fast or ran 100 feet. His pro-
posed answer was objected to on the ground that 
there was no evidence that this child walked or ran 
into the street, upon the further ground that any 
statistical analysis of anything based on seven 
people would not be a reliable statistical analysis, 
upon the further ground that the speed at which 
children walk or run is something that is within 
the experience of ordinary human beings and not 
something on which the jury needs expert testi-
mony, and that the testimony was therefore in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial (R. 299, 300, 
301). The court excluded the testimony and the 
plaintiffs in the absence of the jury explained to 
the court that assuming that the child's body was 
lying 18 feet 5 inches from the curb, and assum-
ing that the child's body had been passed over by 
one or more of the right wheels of the truck, and 
assuming that the truck was traveling at a speed 
of approximately 15 to 20 miles per hour and 
generally parallel to the road, and assuming that 
13 
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there was a truck 82 inches wide parkeld within .. 6 
inches of the .south curb and a touring car directly 
behind the truck parked within 6 inGhes of the 
south curb vvith a width of 70 inches, and ass~ming 
the child was walking at a speed of the average of 
these girls, they proposed to show the minimum 
distance the truck traveled between the time that 
the child left the north side of the parke·d cars and 
the time she was struck by the truck by the testi-
mony of a Dr. Gardner (R. 303). Plaintiffs did 
not proffer the testimony shown on page 15 of their 
Brief and there is no evidence to that effect in the 
record. The court refused to allow the evidence on 
the theory that it was incompetent and too specu-
lative and that there was no sufficient hypothesis 
or g·rounds on which to base the hypothetical ques-
tion (R. 309). 
After being instructed by the court, whose in-
structions we shall dtTscuss later, the case was 
submitted to the jury who returned a verdict of 
"no cause of action" in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs ( R. 369). The plaintiffs filed 
a Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Ver-
dict and a· Motion For New Trial (R. 134, 13'5, 
136), which were de11ied by the court '(R. 13'7). 
The plaintiffs complain of the action of the 
court in a number of respects which we shall de-
fine and discuss as outlined in the following state-
ment of points. 
14 
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STATE ME NT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE v·E R D I C T DESPITE 
PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION T H A T THE OVER-
WHELMING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A DIRECTED 
VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
THE PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK THE GIRLS OF THE 
SAME AGE AS DECEASED TO WALK OR RUN A 
DISTANCE OF 100 FE'ET. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID N'OT ERR IN REFUSING PLAIN-
TIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 TO THE 
EFFECT THAT NILA HALES EXERCISED ORDIN-
ARY AND REASONABLE CARE FOR HER OWN 
SAFETY. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON NEGLIGENCE, 
PROXIMATE CAUSE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED A FAIR AND IMP AR-
TIAL HEARING AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY 
ANY MISCONDUCT O·F DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL 
OR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN OR WERE 
NOT GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
ARGU'MENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT DESPITE 
15 
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PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION . T H A T THE OVER-
WHELMING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A DIRECTED 
VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. 
The plaintiffs cite a number of cases and auth-
orities in their Brief to the effect that a greater 
degree of care is owed by a motorist to children 
than would be owed to adults under the same or 
similar circumstances, and with this we have no 
quarrel. The question in this case is not whether 
such a degree of care is owing to children. The ques-
tion is not whether the plaintiffs feel that the de-
fendants were exercising that degree of care at the 
time of the acident. The only question which arises 
is whether the jury might have found from the 
evidence that the defendants were exercising that 
degree of care. The jury having resolved that the 
defendants were exercising that degree of care, we 
must review the evidence in the light most favor-
able to that resolution, Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah (2d) 
193, 264 Pac. (2d) 855. 
The case of Cotant v. United States (U. S. Dis-
trict Court, D. Idaho E.), 103 Fed. Supp. 770, quoted 
extensively in plaintiffs' brief, differs substantially 
with the facts in the case at bar. In that case the 
driver of. a United· States mail truck, who was 
driving down a residential street, had a clear and 
unobstructed view of the whole area, including a 
number of children and the plaintiff child. Mter 
that accident the driver admitted that he was not 
16 
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watching the children· but was looking for another 
mail carrier in a different direction. In this case 
the defendant driver never had an opportunity to 
see the deceased child prior to the accident because 
his view was obstructed by five automobiles parked 
along the curb on the side of the roa:d from whence 
she came in front of one of the automobiles. The 
defendant driver had seen the children playing ball 
on the unfen~ced grounds of the school on the op-
posite side of the road. The only criticism which can 
be leveled at him, if indeed we can criticize him, 
was that the defendant driver was directing a great-
er part of his attention to those children, which, 
as we view the situation from his point of view 
before the acident occurred, was the prudent thing 
to do. In fact, he was doing just the opposite of 
the driver in Cotant v. United States, supra. Having 
seen children playing on the north side of the road 
and anticipating one of them might come into the 
street in pursuit of a ball, he was doing just what 
the court in that case said he should do, and that 
is keep those children under his careful observa-
tion. By this we do not mean to imply that he di-
rected all of his attention to that side of the road, 
because his testimony shows that he observed both 
sides of the road; otherwise he would not have been 
aware of the cars parked and the situation on the 
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The plaintiffs also assume that .~he deceased 
had crossed 18% feet into the street at the time 
she was hit, which is not 'borne out by the record, 
at least as the jury may have viewed it. The child's 
body did apparently come to rest in. the vicinity of 
the blood spot on the road, the center of which was 
18lj2 feet from the south side of the road (R. 223) 
and directly out from the east side of the alley 
(Exhibits 8 and 11, R. 195, 197). However, the 
witness Gerald Christensen, who saw the .child dart 
out into the street, states that she came from back 
of the principal's car and in front of the Hales car 
and that her body was "flipped", which indicates 
that she entered the highway at least a car length 
west of the west side of the alley and that her body 
was knocked or carried to the point at which it came 
to rest. David Weldon testified the child was knocked 
eight or fifteen steps. (R. 267). 
In Section .1492, Blashfield's Cyclopedia Of 
Automobile Law And Practice, Volume 2A, the sec-
tion following that set out in plaintiffs' brief, Blash-
field, after discussing the rule set out in plaintiffs' 
brief, says : 
"However, the mere occurrence of a colli-
sion between a motor vehicle and a minor on 
the street does not of itself establish the driv-
er's negligence. In order to sustain a charge of 
negligence against such a ·.driver, some evi-
dence justifying men of ordinary reason .and 
fairness in saying that the driver could have 
18 
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avoide·d the acci'dent in the exercise of reason-
able care must be shown. 
"In the absence of such a situation, until 
an 'automobile driver has notice of presence or 
likelihood of children near line of travel, the 
rule as to the degree of care to be exercised as 
to children is the same as it is with respect 
to adults, and an automobilist, not seeing or 
put on notice of children on or near the road-
way, is not negligent in failing to decrease 
speed, particularly where he could not have 
avoided the accident had he decreased his 
speed." 
Or to state it as the court has stated it in Green 
v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539, 244 Pac. 906 
"The test of defendant's liability is 
whether he exercised such care with respect 
to the speed and control of his automobile 
as an ordinarily prudent person would have 
exercised under similar circcmstances ; the 
degree of care bein·g greater when the safety 
of children is involved." 
Following that rule, this court in Alvarado v. 
Tucker et al, 2 Utah (2d) 16, 268 Pac. (2d) 986 
sustained a judgment of the District Court dismis-
sing the action where it appeared that an eleven 
year old girl was struck by an automobile in an 
area zoned for a speed of 25 miles per hour, there 
being a question in the case as to whether the de-
fendant was exceeding the speed limit. This court 
said: 
"Even if the plaintiff were correct in 
her contention that the evidence would jus-
19 
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tify a finding of 5 or 10 miles per hour in 
excess of the speed limit, she would still be 
faced with the necessity of proving that such 
excess of speed was the proximate cause of 
the injury. Under the facts here shown, that 
as defendant was proceeding southward, the 
plaintiff darted westward across the street 
and came out from behind the north bound 
car into defendant's course of travel. Nothing 
appears in the evidence, either directly or from 
reasonable inference, to indicate that he could 
have stopped in time to avoid striking plain-
tiff, even if he had been traveling only 25 
miles per hour. In other words, from anything 
that appears, the fact of such excess speed 
would not have made the difference between 
hitting or avoiding plaintiff." 
And again in the case of Alvarez v. Paulus, 8 
Utah (2d) 283, 3'33 Pac. (2d) 633, an action brought 
for the death of the plaintiff's 22 month old daught-
er who was struck by a backing truck which was 
driven by the defendant, that being the only proof, 
this court .. held that the 
"Plaintiff had the burden of proving the 
negligence of Paul Paulus (the defendant) 
and that such negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident." 
The evidence in this case is that the defendant 
driver, Paul Caldwell, was proceeding along the 
street in front of the elementary school at a careful 
and ·cautious rate of speed, 15 to 20 miles per hour, 
and that he was mindful of the fact that he was 
passing in front of a school and was keeping a look-
20 
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out for children in the vicinity. The deceased child 
darted out into the street and into the side of the 
truck, being run over by the rear dual wheels. On 
the basis of this evidence the jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendants. Plaintiffs in their brief have 
cited cases to the effect that a higher degree of care 
is owed to children, with which we concur. They 
would have us infer negligence from the mere hap-
pening of the accident and nothing more. To find 
that the court was required under such evidence 
to direct a verdict or to set aside the verdict or enter 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is tant-
amount to holding that a driver of a motor vehicle 
is the insurer of the safety of all children who enter 
upon a highway and liable for any injury which 
might come to said children without regard to the 
question of whether or not the driver is negligent 
and regardless of the circumstances. Such is not 
the law and it would have been error for the judge 
to so hold. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
THE PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK THE GIRLS OF THE 
SAME AGE AS DECEASED TO WALK OR RUN A 
DISTANCE OF 100 FEET. 
The plaintiffs sought to solve this whole law-
suit for the jury by having the school principal, 
Roger E. Nielsen, a witness friendly to the plain-
21 
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tiffs, take the stand and testify as to certain tests 
which .he had conducted, wherein .he had ~even girls 
first walk and then run 100 feet .. They then pro-
posed to have this witness testify_ as to the time 
that each of these girls took. Based upon this testi-
mony and an assumption that the point of im_pact 
was 18 feet 5 inches from the south curb and an 
assumption that the truck was going 15 to 20 miles 
per hour, they then proposed to have a physicist 
speculate on how far the truck would have traveled 
during the time the ch,ild was going into the street 
and admittedly come up with conclusions as arrived 
at in their brief that the truck could have traveled 
anywhere from 17 feet to 73 feet. The speculative 
nature of this evidence is best illustrated by the vari-
ance in the ·conclusion at which the expert witness 
would have arrived. 
Assuming this proffer of proof to have been 
otherwise admissible, it could have served no pur-
pose in the case because there was no evidence upon 
which plaintiffs could have framed a hypothetical 
question to solicit the opinion of their expert. Plain-
tiffs assume that the point of impact was in the 
center of the blood spot found on the highway 181f2 
feet out from the edge of the road, but the Record 
does not bear. them out. The only t\vo eye witnesses 
to the accident were David Weldon, if indeed he was 
an eye witness, and Gerald Christensen. On direct 
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examination the witness David Weldon testified on 
at least two occasions that he had not seen the acci-
dent. On page 262 of the Record he was asked 
tion 
"Q. Where did you see her? 
''A. Well, the last time I seen her she 
was down by the swings.'' 
On page 264 of the Record the court said 
"THE COURT: Well, he just said, I 
believe, that the last time he saw her she was 
on the other side of the street on the swings. 
"WITNESS: Yes." 
On cross examination he was asked the ques-
''Q. Now when you were being asked by 
Mr. Eliason when you saw Nila, you said that 
the last time that you saw her was down by 
the swings? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Now was that the last time you 
saw Nila? 
"A. Yes." 
If, however, we accept his testimony, he testi-
fied relative to the point of impact as follows (R 
267) 
"Q. Did you hear anybody, did N ila say 
anything when she walked in the street? 
"A. She said, 'Help, help,' when the 
car hit her at first. 
* * * * 
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"A. In the middle of the road. 
* * * * 
"A. It was going east. 
"Q. It was going east, and then what· 
did Nila do when she hollered, 'Help, help?' 
"A. The truck hit her and knocked her. 
''Q. And it knocked her? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And about how far did it knock her? 
"A. Eight or fifteen steps." 
So, according to his testimony, if we accept the 
same, Nila's body came to rest at the point where 
the blood spot was found 8 to 15 steps from where 
she was hit. 
Gerald Christensen testified that the child dart-
ed out into the street from in back of the principal's 
car and in front of the Hales car and that her body 
was "flipped", which puts the point of impact at 
least the width of the alley and the length of the 
principal's car away from where the blood spot was 
found. 
The assumption that the minor child in this 
case was walking ·was based on the testimony of 
David Weldon and it has already been illustrated 
how unreliable his testimony was. But whether we 
accept his testimony or not, it is apparent that the. 
plaintiffs'· proposed hypothetical question was im-
proper because there is ·no . evidence as to how far. 
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the child walked or ran. The indications are that 
it was consi1derably less than the 18¥2 feet that 
the plaintiffs assume, and it would certainly have 
been improper for the court to permit testimony 
upon a hypothetical question which is not supported 
by the evidence in the Record. 
Again it should be pointed out that the state-
ments appearing on page 15 of the plaintiffs' brief 
as to what they proposed to prove are not contained 
within their proffer of proof to the District Court. 
The fact that there is no evidence in the Record to 
support the opinions which plaintiffs propose to 
show by their expert should dispose of this issue, 
but it would seem there are other objections to the 
proposed evidence. In the first instance the tests 
upon which the plaintiffs propose the hypothetical 
evidence and base their hypothetical questions and 
have their expert testify were made by a witness 
who, himself, was not an expert in the matters tested 
and by a witness admittedly prejudiced in behalf 
of the plaintiffs and hence their reliability is sub-
ject to serious question. 
In a criminal case in Missouri, State of Missouri 
v. Arthur Allison, 51 S. W. (2d) 51, the State, over 
objection of defendant, introduced testimony of cer-
tain experiments made shortly before trial by wit-
nesses who were not and did not claim to be experts 
for the purpose of demonstrating the effect, especi-
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ally as to powder burns, of the near discharge ·Ot 
the-gun with which Ia person was killed, using shells 
found in the house. It was urged that the admission 
of this evidence was prejudicially erroneous, with 
which the court agreed, saying: 
" ... The general rule is that a nonex-
pert witness will not be .permitted to testify to 
the results of experiments made out of court, 
but that a witness, who is an expert and has 
made experiments under conditions and cir-
cumstances as nearly similar as possible_ to 
those in the concrete case, may be permitted 
to state the result of his experiments made 
out of court . . . Evidence based on experi-
ments, however, should be received with the 
greatest caution. The cautions to be obser-
ved are that, unless the experiments are shown 
to have been made under essentially the same 
conditions as in the concrete case, the ten-
dency is to confuse and mislead rather than 
enlighten the jury." 
The question of whether or not evidence of tests 
or experiments should be received is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. As said iri 
20 Am. Jur. 249: 
" .... Evidence of the result of an actual 
experiment or test is admissible to aid in de-
termining the issues in a case where it is 
shown that the conditions under which the ex-
periment or test was made were the same 
or' similar to the circumstances prevailing at 
the time of the occurrence involved in the 
controversy. Such evidence should, however, 
be· admitted only where it is obvious to the 
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court from the nature of the ex-periments that 
the jury will be enlightened, r~ther than con-
fused.'' 
The movement of childre~ is a. generally ob-
served phenomenon and would.seem to be a matter 
within the common knowledge of the average juror. 
He may not ·be able to define this in specific children 
but all of us have, from time to time, observed 
children and are generally familiar with the speed 
at which they may walk or run or dart and their 
relative speed in regard to other objects. The prof-
fered evidence would seem to be inadmissible upon 
the ground that it falls within the classification of 
those matters of which we all have common knowl-
edge. As is said in 20 Am. Jur. 651: 
"Expert opinion testimony, while not 
limited or restricted in· its scope to matters 
of science, art, or skill, is not allowed to in-
vade the field of common knowledge. Such 
testimony cannot be received either to prove 
or to disprove those things which are supposed 
to lie within the common knowledge, experi-
ence, an'd education of men. It is inaidmissible 
where the matter under consideration is of 
such a character that anyone of ordinary in-
telligence,. "vithout any peculiar habits or 
course of stt1dy, would be able to form a cor-
rect opinion. If the subject is one of common 
knowledge, as to which the facts can be in-
telligently described to the jury and under-
stood by them and they can form a. reason-
able opinion for themselves, the opinion of 
an expert will be rejected. The mere fact that 
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a witness ·may know more concerning the sub-
ject of inquiry and may better comprehend 
it than the jury does not qualify him as an 
expert whose opinion testimony may be given, 
unless the subject of inquiry relates to some 
trade; profession, science, or art in which 
persons instructed therein by study or ex-
perience may be supposed to have more skill 
and knowledge than jurors of average intel-
ligence. Unless the subject of inquiry does 
relate to some trade, profession, science, or 
art, it is within the province of the jury to 
form their own opinion, and not of the wit-
nesses, although experts, to express theirs. 
It ils possible that the jurors may have less 
skill and experience than the witnesses and 
yet be able to draw their own conclusions. Ex-
pert testimony is not available for the pur-
pose of giving a word of common meaning a 
technical significance." 
Thus, in the case of Alabama Great Southern 
Railroad Company v. Burnett Morgan Bishop 
(Ala.), 265 Ala. 118, 8'9 So. ( 2d) 738, 64 A.L.R. 
(2d) 1190, in an action against the railway com-
pany for bodily injury sustained when a train struck 
a pedestrian at a crossing, the defendant's foot hav-
ing been caught in a crevice, it was held error to 
allow an expert . to testify as to the danger created 
by_ .a crevice 2 inches wide and 6 inches deep. The 
court said; 
"The strict question with regard to this 
testimony is whether or not an average juror 
would be capable of forming a correct con-
clusion in respect to the safeness or .. unsafe-
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ness for persons to walk over a crevice two 
inches wide and six inches deep in a populous 
railroad crossing. If this question is answered 
in the affirmative, the trial court was in 
error in allowing, over the defendant's objec-
tio_n,_ the expert to expres'S the aforementioned 
0p1n1ons. 
" ... We conclude that the subject here 
under examination, e.g., a crevice in a crossing 
(any more than a hole in the sidewalk or 
street) does not require expert opinion that 
it would be safe or unsafe for pedestrians for 
the reason that, given the physical facts, the 
ordinary mind is capable of forming a judg-
ment thereon." 
And in the case of Sylvia Burton v. Horn & 
Hardart Baking Company (Pa.), 371 Pa. 60, 88 A. 
(2d) 873, 63 A.L.R. (2d) 731, it was held not to 
be error, in an action against a restaurant pro-
prietor for bodily injury sustained by a patron upon 
slipping on interior steps which were slightly wet 
due to a recent washing, to reject an offer by the 
plaintiff to prove by an expert witness that the 
steps were improperly constructed in that they did 
not contain an abrasive material or have a safety 
tread, and that terrazzo steps are slippery and 
dangerous when wet. The court said that this was 
a matter which was within the common knowledge 
of the jury. 
Lastly, the proffered testimony would appear 
to be inadmissible in that it seeks to invade the pro-
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vince of the jury and decide the ultimate i'ssue on 
the case. As illustrated by page 15 of their brief, 
the plaintiffs proposed to show not simply how 
many feet a car travelin·g at a certain speed would 
travel in a certain period of time or how fast a child 
could walk or run, but they would have the physicist 
conclude that given a certain hypothesis the defen-
dant driver should have seen the child in time to 
react and stop the truck prior to the actual impact 
and that he was, therefore, negligent, which is the 
very ilssue which the jury was impaneled to de-
cide. A ·c·ase in point is Mary Wawryszyn v. Illinois 
Central Railroad Compilny (Ill), 10 Ill. App. (2d) 
394, 135 N. E. (2d) 154, 61 A.L.R. (2d) 801. That 
action was brought to recover for the death of a :rail-
road employee· as a result of a crated diesel motor 
falling off a dolly during a loading operation being 
performed by the employee and fellow employees. 
The witness was permitted to testify whether or not 
in his experience it was a good practice to load a 
motor of a certain type on a certain truck, and ex-
pressed the opinion that it was not. It was held error 
for the court to deny the defendant's objection, the 
cou~t saying: 
"We believe it can be said to be the law 
of this state that neither an expert nor a non-
expert witness may give his opinion on an 
ultimate issue in the case. 
"The purpose of the ultimate issue rule 
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is to preserve the independence. of the jury. 
Its application should not be ·affected by tech-
nical, semantical distinctions. If · the prob-
abilities are that the jury will construe an 
e~pert's ~pinion th'at defen·dant's conduct or 
.method was b·ad or improper to be the ex-
pert's opinion on the ultimate issue of negli-
gence, then, according to the purpose of the 
rule, that opinion should not be allowed ... " 
The case of Hooper v. Gener,al Motors Corpora-
tion (Utah), 260 Pac. (2d) 549, cited in the fore-
going case, is somewhat contrary to this rule. In 
that case an expert witness was allowed to testify 
as to what occurred to cause a separation of the 
spi'der 'and rim of the wheel of a truck, the court 
. 
saying: 
" ... opinions as to the cause of a par-
ticular occurrence or accident given by wit-
nesses possessing peculiar skill or knowledge 
-that is, exp€rts- are admissible where the 
subject matter is not one of common observa-
tion or knowledge, or in other words, where 
witnessess because of peculiar ·knowledge are 
competent to reach an intelligent conclusion 
and inexperienced person'S are likely to prove 
incapable of forming a correct judgment with-
out skilled assistance ... " 
It should be pointed out, however, that the testi-
mony in the HoopeT case, supra, went to a very 
technical matter upon which the jury would need 
very technical assistance. In this case the. question 
is one upon which the jury, given ·all of the facts, 
can decide the issue. 
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. . 
In· this· respect w~ thin~ that it ·should be kept 
in mind the purpose for which. th.e .. evidence in this 
case was: offered,· and that is as a basis· for the 
testimony· of the plaintiffs'·· _expert. For instance, 
testimony that a vehicle traveling 15 or 20 miles 
per hour will travel ·a certain number of feet per 
second, if material, would not be inadmissible since 
that information might h·ave been helpful to the 
jury. The purpose of all of this evidence, the tests 
and experiments was merely to prepare the way for 
the hypothetical question which appears on page 
303 of the Record to be asked of the physicist, to 
the effect th·at if we assume that the child's body 
was laying 18 feet 5 inches from the curb and that 
the truck was going at a certain speed, what his 
opinion would be. We believe that we have suffici-
ently illustrated that such a hypothetical question 
is improper in that there is no evidence in the record 
to support it, there being no evidence in the record 
as to the ·distance traveled by the child. To have 
permitted an expert to answer such a question would 
have been sheer speculation since his own estimate 
varies anywhere from 17 to 73 feet an·d he is in 
effect saying to the jury, take your choice. More-
over, the matters upon which plaintiffs' counsel 
woutd have the expert testify are matters which 
are within the common knowledge of the jury, are 
'b·ased on tests which are not reliable and invade 
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the province of the jury by substituting the expert's 
opinion for that of the jury upon matters where 
expert testimony is unnecessary. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NIOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAIN-
TIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 TO THE 
EFFECT THAT NILA HALES EXERCISED ORDIN-
ARY AND REASONABLE CARE FOR HER OWN 
SAFETY. 
The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in 
failing to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 
14 as follows: 
"You are instructed that based upon the 
commonly known fact that the instinct for 
self-preservation is such that persons use or-
dinary and reasonable care for their own 
safety. The law permits you to assume that 
Nila Hales, at the time of and immediately 
preceding the incident in question, was exer ... 
cising due care for her own safety. And you 
may make findings in accordance therewith 
unless you are persuaded from a preponder .. 
ance of the evidence th·at she was guilty of 
contributory negligence, as elsewhere in these 
instructions defined.'' 
This contention is specifically answered in the case 
of Yoshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 Utah (2d) 39, 296 
Pac. (2d) 287, which was also ~ death action. The 
court in that case said: 
"As to the first point on appeal, plain-
tiffs were not entitled to an instruction that 
the decedent was presumed to be acting with 
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due care for her own safety. The trial court 
instructed that the defendant had the burden 
df proving his affirmative assertion of con-
tributory negligence by a prepon·derance of 
the evidence, and it has been indicated that 
there is no need to give an instruction to em-
phasize the burden of going forward with evi-
dence where the defendant also has the burden 
of persuasion, as here. Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 
Utah, 249 P. 21d 213. In fact, it is said in 
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 7·9, 262 P. 2d 
2'85, 291: 
" ' ... Thus defendant not only had the 
burden of going forward with the evidence 
but of persua'ding the jury on that issue. So 
in cases where the question of proving con-
tributory negligence is involved this pre-
sumption can never be of any aid to the rep-
resentatives of the deceased, because their 
opponent without the presumption has the 
burden of persu·ading the jury th·at he was 
guilty of such negligence 'vhich is a greater 
burden than and includes the burden of 
going forward with the evidence.'" 
There is even less need for the instruction in 
this case than in the case of Okuda v. Rose, supra, 
for in this case there is evidence that the child 
darted out or walked out into the path of the truck. 
As was said by the court in Okuda v. Rose, supra, 
"There is no direct evidence in this case 
as to just what the decedent was doing at the 
time she was struck; the jury was required to 
make that determination from circumstantial 
evidence. They may have believed defendant's 
·testimony th·at his car did not leave the trav-
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eled portion of the highway, ·11oted the evi-
dence that Mrs. Oku·da was dressed entirely 
in black, inferred that- she was struck in the 
roadway .and her body· tossed by the impact 
to the shoulder. Therefore, by merely being 
in the path of automolbiles on a.heavily trav-
eled, but poorly lighted street, they could con-
clude, she \Vas guilty of contributory negli-
gence regardless of whether she was attempt-
. ing to cross the street or walking in an area 
reserved for vehicular traffic. Such inferences 
have always been held proper determinations 
for the jury to m·ake." 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON NEGLIGENOE, 
PROXIMATE CAUSE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
In Point IV of their brief the plaintiffs com-
plain that the court instructed the jury twice on 
negligence, proximate cause and contributory negli-
gence and cite as examples Instructions No. 8 and 
No. 13. In Instruction No. 8 the court defined "con-
tributory negligence" an·d its legal effect and in 
Instruction No. 13 the court stated that the plain-
tiffs could not recover if negligence on the part of 
Nila Hales proximately contributed to her own in-
jury and death. The court also gave Instruction No. 
5 to the effect that it is the burden of the defen-
dants to prove. that Nila Hales was guilty of contri-
butory negligence as alleged in defendants' Answer. 
Simply because a term is mentioned two or three 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
times in the instructions by the court outlining the 
issues. to the jury does not in and of itself create 
a presumption that the instructions are prejudicial, 
provided the instructions are otherwise proper, and 
the fundamental inquiry resolves itself down as to 
whether or not it was proper for the court to in.:. 
struct the jury in regard to these issues. I think 
there can be no question that instructions on negli-
gence and proximate cause were proper and I shall 
confine my further discussions to the issue of con-
tributory negligence ·and unavoidable accident. 
In the case cited by the plaintiffs, Bennett v.· 
Deaton (Idaho), 68 Pac. (2d) 895, an action was 
brought by the parents to recover for the death of 
their minor son. The evidence was that at or about 
the time of the collision the defendant Deaton was 
driving his automobile on the right side of a high-
way in a northerly direction at a speed of about 50 
miles per hour. One E'dsel H. Christensen was trav-
eling with a team and wagon on the other side of 
the highway in a southerly direction. Several young 
boys from 8 to 13 years of age, among them the 
deceased for whom the action was brought, diagon-
ally crossed a field from the west and arrived on 
or near the highway on the westerly side thereof 'at 
the point where the Christensen team and wagon 
was traveling. The boys then continued walking in 
a northerly direction, not in a body, but at scattered 
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intervals. At about the time of, or shortly after, 
the passage of the Deaton automobile and the wagon 
of Christensen, the deceased was struck by the auto-
mobile. No one, except Mrs. Deaton, saw the youth 
at the instant he was struck; some other witnesses 
saw him immediately 'before the impact ·and others 
immediately afterward. Mrs. Deaton testified that 
the boys were in back of the wagon and just at the 
instant the Deaton automobile passed the back of 
the wagon the deceased came with his back toward 
them, running onto the road, and was hit with the 
left fender of the defen·dant's car. The court con-
cluded: 
"From the foregoing evidence it would 
appear that it might well be determined that 
the collision occurreld in one of at least three 
ways. First, from the evidence of Christen-
sen, it might be determined th·at deceased was 
struck on the easterly shoulder of the road; 
second, it might be determined th·at deceased 
was struck while crossing the highway from 
the easterly shoulder to the west side; and 
thirdly, that the deceased was struck in the 
manner as testified to by Mrs. Deaton ; name-
ly, that the 'deceased backed out running b·ack-
wards diagonally ·across the highway and to 
the south, with his back to the car, as the 
Deaton automobile was going north and past 
the back end of the wagon. As to the first two 
possibilities above suggested there was evi-
dence to support a finding by the jury of neg-
ligence on the part of appellant Deaton -
the speed at which he was driving, the fact· 
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that he did not see~the·boy or any of the boys, 
other boys. being on the highway still fur~ 
ther north and some being in the borrow pit 
on the 'Side of· the highway, until after strik-
ing the deceased with the left front of the 
car, the fact .that the evidence disclosed no 
obstruction of vision which would have in-
terferred with seeing the deceased and at least 
some of the other boys under such circum• 
stances, and the fact that no warning, of the 
horn, or otherwise, was given. There is little 
if any eviden·ce of contributory negligence 
on the part of the decea·sed with relation to 
these first two possilbili'ties. As to the third 
possibility as disclosed by the record it may 
be conceded that the question of contributory 
negligence on the part of deceased was pre-
sented ... " 
In this case the most reasonable explanation of 
this accident which is supported by the record and 
the testimony of the witnesses is that the deceased, 
Nila Hales, "darted" out into the street from behind 
the principal's car and in front of her mother's 
car into the right han:d side of the defendants' ve-
hicle, apparently without looking or ·ascertaining 
th.at such ·a movement could be made in safety and 
at a point where it was her duty to surrender the 
right of way to the ·defend·ants' vehicle. Under the 
circumstances, if the jury should find th·at this did 
not measure up to that degree of care which or-
dinarily would be exercise(} by children of the same 
age, intelligence and .. experience ('as instructed by 
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the court) , then the deceased · would :be guilty of 
contributory negligence. and it was 'Surely proper 
for the court to submit this issue to the jury. 
The instruction on "unavoida'ble accident" is 
in substan·ce merely a consolidation of Instructions 
16.6 and 16.1 from Jury Instruction Forms for 
Utah, not that this authority in an'd of itself estab-
lishes their correctness. Plaintiffs seem to imply 
that this instruction should be reserved to those in-
stances where the accident might be 'due to weather 
condi'tions or an Act of God or an extreme emer-
gen·cy and suggest that the jury should ·consider 
the unavoid'ability of an accident as an issue or a 
ground of defense. ·However, it may be said that 
not to give the instruction is to suggest to the jury 
that proof of negligence is clear or that the circum-
stances of the accident tend to affirm negligence 
on someone's part or, in other words, the failure 
to give the instruction would suggest to. the jury 
that they must find that the acci'dent was caused 
by negligence on some person's part. 
In the case of Parker v. W onuLck, 3'7 Cal. ( 2d) 
11'6, 230 Pac. (2'd) 823 ( 1951), a divided ·court held 
that there is a rare occasion when instructions on 
un·avoidable accidents are not appropriate unless 
the defendant is negligent as a matter of law. The 
dissent in that case was ·based upon the contention 
that the instruction in question added nothing to 
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the usual instructions· covering negligence and pro~­
imate .cause- and burden of proof an'd that, · there-' 
fore, there ·appeared· to be no ·reason to give it. The 
most apparent answer to this logic is that the jury 
should be made to understand th·at they need not 
necessarily fin'd either party negligent. 
An instruction which read 
"You are instructed that if you believe 
from the evidence that the injury to the plain-
tiff was the result of unavoidable accident 
and that the defendants' negligence was not. 
the cause thereof, your verdict should be in 
favor of defendant. no cause of action" 
was approved in the Utah case of Nelson v. Lott, 81 
Utah 2'65, 17 Pac. (2d) 2'72. 
The instruction has also been approved in the 
Arizona case of Stuart v. Castro, 76 Ariz. 147, 
261 P·ac. (2d) 371, where an animal suddenly darte'd 
in front of ·an automobile traveling at a reasonable 
rate of speed on a highway and was struck before 
the driver of the automobile could avoid the accident. 
In Anderson v. Bendily, App. 66 So. (2d) 35S 
the Louisian·a court approved the instruction under 
similar circumstances. 
As was s'aid in the Texas case of Kuykendall v. 
Doose, Tex. Civ. App., 260 S. W. (2d) 435 
"In determining whether issue of un-
avoi'dable accident is involved, facts of par-
ticular case must be examined Ito ascertain· 
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whether there is presented a theory under 
which accident could have happened, notwith-
standing all parties to transaction exercised 
degree of care required by law, and in so 
examining the facts evidence must be con-
strued in light most favorable to submission 
of the issue." 
Applying that test to the case at hand, the 
theory of the defense in this case was that the de-
ceased child darte'd into the roadway and into the 
path of the defendants' truck at such a time and 
under such circumstances that the ldefen~dant ·driver 
was not guilty of negligence in failing to see her. 
The jury may well have so found from the evidence 
in this case. In view of the fact that the deceased 
was a child and not held to the same standard of 
conduct as an adult, the jury might also have found 
from the evidence th·at the child did not fail to exer-
cise that degree of care required of a child of her 
age, experien·ce and intelligence in darting or run-
ning into the street, which of course leads us to 
one conclusion - that the jury in this case might 
well h·ave found that the defendant !driver was not 
guilty of negligence in failing to see the child and 
the child was not guilty of negligence as ·a child in 
darting into the street and that the accident was, 
therefore, unavoidable. Under such ·circumstances 
it wou~d seem that the giving of an instruction that 
they might so find was perfectly proper. 
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POINT V. 
PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED A FAIR AND IMP AR-
TIAL HEARING AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY 
ANY MISCONDUCT O·F DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL 
OR INSTRUCTI10NS WHICH WERE GIVEN OR WERE 
NOT GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
During his argument to the jury one of defense 
counsel did make the statement th·at the highway 
patrolman and investigating officers in the case 
had not issued any arrest or citation to the defen-
dant driver. This was immediately objected to by 
plaintiffs' counsel, who, of course, gave his reasons 
for the objection. The Judge directed the defense 
counsel not to pursue the matter any further. No 
request was made for a direction to the jury to dis-
regard this statement and, according to the recol-
lection of the Judge who tried the ease, none was 
given; nor _was there any motion made for a mis-
trial by plaintiffs' counsel ·at th·at time or at the 
conclusion of the case before the verdict had been 
rendered by the jury. The matter was first raised 
in ·the plaintiffs' Motion For New Trial. 
Since the statement was negative in character 
no harm would appear to h·ave been done by the 
remark. For example, a statement to the effect that 
a witness he·ar·d a whistle blow, being positive in 
character, has a much greater impact than a ~tate­
ment by a witness that he did not hear a whistle 
blow since a whistle may h·ave blown but the witness 
may not h·ave heard it~· The same would be true 
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of a statement to the effect- that the defendant 
driver did not receive a citation .. This· would not 
be construed by a jury to mean that he was, there-
fore, not guilty of any negligence, or at least. not 
to the extent that a statement that he had received 
a citation would be construed by. a· jury to mean 
that he was guilty of negligence. At any rate, the 
objection of plaintiffs' counsel and the direction 
from· the Judge not to pursue the matter further 
would correct any harm that may have been done 
by the statement. 
As is said in 53 Am. Jur. 407: 
"Since in m·any cases the effect of im-
proper argument can be removed by an in-
struction to the jury to disregard it, the courts 
generally require, in order to predicate error 
thereon, that an objection be made at the time 
of the improper statement, so that an oppor-
tunity may be given the attorney making the 
misstatement and the court to rectify the 
damage. Depen~dent upon the circumstances 
of the particular case, sometimes the mere 
sustaining of an objection to the improper 
remark, or the sustaining of an objection, 
together with an adinonition to counsel, will 
be sufficient to remove· the injurious effect 
thereof. 
"In many cases the effect of an improper 
remark in the opening statement or the clos-
ing argument may be cured, upon objection 
of opposing counsel, by· its prompt withdraw-
al by the offending counsel, and when so with-
drawn, in the absence. of. preju,dice, such a re-
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mark is not· ground for reversal. ·Thus, the 
withdrawal by a ·prosecuting attorney of a 
remark made by him which was obj.ected to 
as· a comment on the failure of the defendant 
to testify has been held in several cases to 
cure the error complained of. Likewise, the 
withdrawal and retraction by counsel of an 
improper appeal to racial, religious, social, 
or political prejudice, made by him in his 
·argument to the jury, is sometimes sufficient 
to remove the injurious effect of such argu-
ment,· particularly where accompanied by an 
admonition of counsel by the court or a direc-
tion by the court for the jury to disregard 
the remark. However, in some cases the mere 
withdrawal by counsel of an improper appeal 
to social prejudice has been held insufficent 
to remove the injurious effect thereof." 
The plaintiffs complain of the failure of the 
trial court to give plaintiffs' proposed Instructions 
8, 9 and 10 and cite in support thereof the Calif-
ornia case of Lampton v. Davis Standnrd BreOO 
Company, 191 Pac. (2d) 710, Conroy v. Perez, 148 
Pac. (2'd) 680 and Frederickson v. Costner, 2'21 
Pac. ('2d) 1008 to the effect that a person operat-
ing a vehicle near a school ground has a higher 
degree of care to avoid children than might be the 
case under other circumstances, with which we ·agree. 
However, the court covered this standard of duty 
in its Instruction No. 6 which was as follows: 
"You are iurther instructed th·at inas-
much as this accident and the ensuing death 
occurred immediately in front of an elemen-
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tary school house, at an. hour just before 
school took up and when students were eros~ 
sing the street in coming to school and were 
also playing adjacent to the. street and that 
the defendant, driver, well knew of the pres-
ence . of small children using the street, he is 
required to use such care and caution as the 
circumstances demanded an'd to operate a 
loaded gravel truck past the school under such 
circumstances employing careful and alert 
observation of the danger lying or apparent 
in defendant's path.'' 
This, coupled with Instruction No. 9 to the effect 
that a driver of a car on a public highway ha;s a 
duty to use reasonable care to keep a lookout· for 
other vehicles ·and other conditions reasonably to 
be anticipated and to keep his car under reasonably 
safe and proper control anid to drive at such a speed 
as is safe, reasonable and prudent under the cir-
cumstances, having· due regard to the width, sur-
face anld condition of the highway, the traffic there-
on, the visibility and any potential hazards then 
existing, and the last part of Instruction No. 10 
would appear to be a·ddressed to the same point. 
That instruction provides in part: 
" ... The driver's duty requires him to 
be vigilant at all times, keeping a lookout for 
traffic an,d other conditions reasonably to be 
anticipated, and to keep the vehicle under 
such control that, to avoid a collision with 
any person or with any other object, he can 
stop as quickly as might be _required of him 
by condition.s that would be anticipate·d by 
an ordinary, prudent driver in like position." 
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There is some question as to whether or not 
an instruction to the effect that a driver may be 
responsibie for injury or death to a child, even 
though he did not see the child in time to prevent 
the injury, is proper in that it seems to comment 
upon the evidence. However, whether it is proper 
or not, the mere submission of this case to the jury 
with the instruction that they might return a ver-
dict in favor of the chilld even though the evidence 
indicates that the driver claims he did not see the 
child would seem to be as clear an instruction as 
could be made that the jury coul1d return a verdict 
in favor of the child even though the ·defendant 
driver claims he did not see the child. Otherwise, 
the court would not have submitted the case to the 
jury and the jury could not but have understood 
that they might find the defendants liable to the 
plaintiffs under the circumstances even though the 
defendant driver claimed he did not see the child. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental inquiry involved in this ap-
peal re·duces itself to two questions: 
1. Di'd the plaintiffs receive a fair and im-
partial hearing? 
2. If the plaintiffs did ·receive a fair and im-
partial hearing, might the jury reason·ably find 
from the evidence that· the defendants were not li-
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able to the plaintiffs for the death of the plain-
tiffs' minor daughter or, to state the question in 
another way, did the evidence so prepon,derate in 
the plaintiffs' favor that. the jury could not, as 
reasonable men, resolve the issues other than in 
the plaintiffs' favor? 
There is no question but that a minor chil:d is 
hel'd in a favored status by reason of his tender age, 
and the jury was so instructerd in Instruction No. 
12 which provided as follows: 
"A child is not held to the same standa1•d 
of conduct as an adult and is only required to 
exercise that degree of care which ordinarily 
would be exercised by children of the same 
age, intelligence an·d experience. There is no 
precise age at which, as a matter of law, a 
child comes to be hel'd accountable for her 
actions by the same standard as applies to an 
adult. It is for you to determine i'f the con-
duct of Nila Hales was or was not such as 
might reasonably have been expected from 
a child of the same age, intelligence and ex-
perience, under the same or similar circum-
stances." 
Nor is there any question that a driver, once 
he becomes aware of children, owes a greater duty 
to, children than would be in the case of· an adult, 
an·d again the jury was so instructed. It was in this 
vein that the case was tried and it w·as with this 
idea before the jury that they deliberated and re-
turned ·a verdict for the defendants. 
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· · Plaintiffs claim that: they were prejudiced by 
a rem·ark of the defense counsel in his closing argu~ 
ment. to the effect that the defendant driver ·had 
not received a citation. It is doubtful that such··a 
statement had any effect on the jury, an·d what-
ever effect it m·ay have ha·d was corrected by the 
plaintiffs' objection and the admonition of the court 
to defense counsel. 
Plaintiffs further claim that they were pre-
judiced by the refusal of the court to admit the 
proffered evidence of their physicist who, based on 
certain unrealiable tests by a witness partial to 
the plaintiffs, would have offered his opinion, mak-
ing various assumptions, as to the distance traveled 
by the truck and the child during corresponding 
periods of time. That such evidence would have been 
sheer speculation and not at ·all helpful to the jury 
is best illustrated by the various conclusions which 
the expert would have testifie;d to, that is that the 
truck could have traveleld ·anywhere from 17 feet 
to 73 feet during the time the child was coming 
into the street, granting certain hypothesis. More 
fundamental, however, is the fact that there is no 
evidence in this case on which to base any hypo-
thetical questions to an expert-witness, there being 
no evidence of where the child was hit and, there-
fore,- being no basis for any comp·arative analysis 
between the distances traveled by the truck and 
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the child. Moreover, such evidence as there is upon 
which plaintiffs proposed to base their hypothetical 
questions comes from the mouth of a .witness who 
on several occasions on direct examination admitted 
that he did not see the accident. 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favor-
able to the defen·dants, as we must do at this point, 
the jury, as reasonable men, could well have found 
that the defendant driver, even though he was aware 
of the fact that he was passing a school ground 
was driving at a reason·able speed of 15 to 20 miles 
per hour an·d that the child darte'd out from behind 
parked cars into the side of the defendants' vehicle 
when said vehicle ha:d reached such a point that 
the defen·dant driver in the exercise of reasonable 
care was not negligent in failing to see her and 
stop his vehicle. They coul1d well have found, and 
apparently did, that her movements prior to com-
ing out into the street were obscured by the auto-
mobiles parked along the south side of the road and 
that the defendant driver was not negligent in fail-
ing to notice her prior to the time she darte'd out 
into the street. And they might further have found 
that the deceased, Nila Hales, was not exercising 
that degree of care which might reasonably be ex-
pected of a child nine years of age when she appar-
ently darted out into the street and into the side 
of the approaching truck without first ascertaining 
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that such movement could be m·ade in safety. 
We submit that the plaintiffs received a fair 
and impartial hearing of their case in the District 
Court, that any error which was committed by the 
District Court was not prejudicial an·d that the ver-
dict of the jury was supported by the evidence in 
the case. To hold otherwise would be to say that 
the defendants were guilty of negligence merely 
by reason of the fact that the accident occurred and 
the deceased was a chiid nine years of age. It is, 
therefore, our conclusion that the ju,dgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed and the appeal 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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